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ABSTRACT
An Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) is a new computing model that allows shar-
ing computing power of multiple mobile devices. For a diverse group of individuals
that employ such computing model, in an ad-hoc manner, secure peer-to-peer com-
munication becomes very important. Using private or pairwise keys to secure such
communication is preferable to public-keys because of computation and energy re-
quirements. With the advent of sensor enabled mobile devices, a protocol (SekGens)
that uses sensor data to generate pairwise keys on demand has been proposed. To
work successfully SekGens requires devices to be closely located and becomes infeasi-
ble for devices situated multiple hops away. SekGens is also expensive in computation
and slow in key generation. In this thesis, we investigate how to enable devices in
an AMC to establish pairwise keys. We propose an efficient solution which tries to
reduce the number of executions of SekGens in the AMC, and establishes pairwise
keys between mobile phones multiple hops away by distributing parts of the key on
multiple routing paths. Our results show a reduction of up to 75% in the number of
SekGens required to establish keys in an AMC, when compared to a naive approach.
Also the execution time to come up with the optimal pairs is within 10s of seconds
for reasonably large networks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, such as cellphones, tablets, etc. are ubiquitous in today’s world.
In addition to traditional communication tasks (e.g. phone calls, text messages),
modern mobile devices enable more complex services such as mobile social network-
ing, crowdsensing, etc [17, 32] due to powerful computing, sensing and networking
capabilities. An Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) is a recently proposed idea, where a
collection of mobile devices form a distributed system in an ad hoc manner. Ad-hoc
Mobile Cloud is defined here in a different way than traditional cloud computing. It
is a collection of mobile devices that are owned by different individuals but collab-
orate among themselves sharing resources, which benefits all the participants [16].
Several interesting applications have been developed for AMC, including peer-to-peer
file sharing, distributed computing [15, 21], collaborative data storage and process-
ing [7,8]. With an AMC, applications are easy to deploy, highly mobile, and do not
rely on infrastructure-based networks.
Although there are multiple advantages for using Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud, it is
paramount to establish secure links among peers in an AMC, especially for data sen-
sitive applications. Key establishment for securing device to device communication
in ad-hoc networks has been under active research [26]. None of existing solutions
use the sensing capability of current mobile devices in generating security keys. In
recent work [1], a protocol (SekGens) uses sensor data gathered from mobile phones
to generate a strong cryptographic pairwise key for a pair of nodes within a certain
range.
Despite its guarantee of generating a strong key for a pair of nodes, the use of
SekGens in large networks remains challenging. First, it is impossible for users that
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are not within a certain range to generate keys with SekGens. Second, generating
keys using SekGens takes non-negligible time and thus it is time consuming for a user
to use SekGens to generate keys with multiple neighbors sequentially. Considering
these two aspects, it is burdensome to use SekGens individually in a network of
relatively larger size (∼40-50) nodes.
We focus on the security issues concerned with such mobile collaborative net-
works. There is possibility of the presence of malicious devices in the network who
might wish to listen to the communication exchange that takes place among two
peers. With wireless medium the security threat becomes more pronounced. It is very
easy for a malicious entity to listen and capture the information being exchanged.
The content that the two peers share might be confidential classified government doc-
uments, military strategy plans or maps, even business proposals, that might have
catastrophic consequences if it falls into wrong or unauthorized individual’s hands.
So securing such peer-to-peer communication is of utmost importance.
Key generation for securing device to device communication in ad-hoc network
has been under active research. One of the novel approach for that called SekGens
is presented in [1]. SekGens uses sensor data from the mobile phones to generate
strong cryptographic pairwise keys. SekGens has its own drawbacks, in terms of
failure to scale with large networks, user inconvenience in generating keys with large
number of peers and finally its inability to function when peers are not within a
certain distance. We address these problems through the combination of SekGens
and intelligent routing of key fragments over Node-disjoint paths, enabling an ad-
hoc MAC of mobile phones to generate secure pairwise keys among them. Since
performing SekGens is expensive and inconvenient optimizing the number of SekGens
for a given number of mobile phones is the problem we try to solve in this paper.
In this thesis, we propose to combine SekGens and Node-disjoint Path Key Es-
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tablishment technique [25] to solve the pairwise key establishment problem in an
Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud. The goal is to establish pairwise keys for all pairs of nodes
while minimizing the number of SekGens executions. Our basic idea is to carefully
choose pairs of nodes that are within a certain range to perform SekGens to estab-
lish secure links, while other pairs establish the keys by exchanging key fragments
over multiple node disjoint paths, whose links are already secured. We analyze the
formulated optimization problem and deduce the lower bound of the optimal value.
In order to solve the problem efficiently, we develop a heuristic algorithm called Sek-
Gens Minimization Algorithm (SMA). We evaluate the proposed algorithm through
simulations and show that it reduces the number of SekGens significantly (up to
75%) when compared to unoptimized naive solutions [27].
The contribution in this thesis is:
• An efficient algorithm for key establishment using node-disjoint paths combined
with the key generation capability of SekGens for an AMC
3
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this chapter, we introduce the two techniques for pairwise key establishment,
namely SekGens and Key Establishment Using Node-Disjoint Paths. We then moti-
vate our research by identifying the drawbacks when each of the techniques is used
individually, and the advantages when the two are combined in an efficient manner.
2.1 Symmetric or Pairwise Key Establishment
Session Key Generated from Sensors (SekGens) algorithm [1] aims at establish-
ing a secure long key (128 bits) between two mobile devices using their contextual
information (i.e., data obtained from device’s sensors). SekGens has three phases. In
the Quantization Phase, the key is iteratively generated based on different sensor’s
data. In the Reconciliation Phase, the two mobile devices eliminate minor differ-
ences in the bits of their keys by using the Cascade reconciliation mechanism. In
the PrivacyAmplication-and-Hashing Phase, the two devices omit all bits exposed
during the reconciliation phase and apply hashing to the remaining secret bits to
strengthen the key. SekGens was implemented and evaluated by modifying the An-
droid code responsible for WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) protocol in Google Nexus 5
and Samsung Galaxy S2 smartphones. The evaluation results show that SekGens is
efficient in generating keys with low mismatch ratio and with high Shannon entropy.
[25] proposes the idea of Key Establishment Using Node-Disjoint Paths. The
idea is to use node-disjoint paths to secure the negotiation and establishment of
a symmetric key between a pair of nodes. Depending on the number of available
node-disjoint paths between a sender and a receiver, the sender divides the key into
a fixed number of fragments. Each fragment is then sent along one of the node-
disjoint paths. The receiver needs to collect all the fragments in order to recreate
4
the complete key. So an attacker has to compromise at least one node on each of the
node-disjoint paths to capture all the fragments to discover the key.
2.2 Motivation
Even though SekGens proves its efficiency and robustness when it runs on same
and different Smartphones that are within a certain distance [1], it has some limi-
tations in case it is used to establish a key for many nodes in AMC networks (i.e.,
multi-hop networks). The time needed to establish a key (i.e., 6 seconds) is relatively
long and impractical for a large number of nodes. Moreover, due to the requirement
of closer distances (i.e., 0, 1.5 or 3 m), called SekGens-distance, between devices
preferred by SekGens, it might be inconvenient or even impossible to generate keys
for a large number of users. As a result, an efficient pairwise key establishment
scheme is required to benefit from SekGens in an AMC.
The Node-disjoint path key establishment scheme has two major limitations.
First, it assumes that the key is already generated and it only decides the path for
distributing the key fragments. There is a need for generating the actual key with
some key generation algorithm in the first place. Secondly, the key fragments can
only be forwarded from one node to the next hop neighbor if there already exists a
pairwise key between them. So keys need to be established between each neighbor
node pair on the node-disjoint paths before the fragments can be securely forwarded
from the source to the destination.
An efficient algorithm for key establishment using node-disjoint paths combined
with the key generation capability of SekGens for an AMC is our contribution in this
paper. Instead of blindly performing SekGens between all device pairs, we minimize
the number of SekGens based on the network size, number of key fragments and
node density. We present experimental results with respect to risk of key being
5
compromised and required number of SekGens performed for a network using varying
number of node-disjoint paths.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Security key is used to encrypt the data before sending over the network. Key
establishment and management for wireless sensor networks is a widely studied area.
Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) is a better resource enriched version of the wireless
sensor network deployment. So the solutions proposed for sensor networks can be
applied with appropriate modifications to AMC systems.
Two types of keys are used in cryptographic systems. The asymmetric key cryp-
tographic scheme, where each device has a private and a public key. The public key
is distributed to the network for every device. The private key is not known by any
one other than the owner. Any information encrypted by device d’s public key can
be deciphered by d’s private key which is known to only d. The other is the symmet-
ric key scheme, where each communicating pair have an unique private pairwise key
between them. For any two devices d1 and d2 there is a key d12 for their exclusive
use and unknown to any other device in the network.
Previous studies have shown that generation and use of asymmetric key requires
a lot of computation power, time and research [18, 31, 34] has shown that it is not
suitable for mobile devices which have a limited battery life. So symmetric, that is
pair-wise key is the preferred solution for such mobile networks.
How to establish strong pairwise keys is another important research problem,
with lot of work been done [2,23,30,35] on secret key generation. Most of the earlier
works rely on physical layer properties and signal properties between the devices and
fail to use any contextual information availably locally to the device. A new protocol,
named SekGens, that uses sensor data gathered from the environment to generate
cryptographically strong keys has been developed in one of our recent works [1].
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We briefly introduced the protocol and described its shortcoming in the previous
chapter. The problem that we are solving in this thesis is unique and specific to the
use of the SekGens for a AMC. That is how it relates to key establishment problem
studied in wireless sensor networks.
We present a brief review of similar works done for pairwise key establishment
for wireless ad-hoc networks. Most of the symmetric key cryptography protocols for
establishing a pairwise key between two devices make use of an on-line key server.
Mitchekk and Piper [28] uses a probabilistic key sharing which avoids the use of
on-line key server. However, the storage requirement is decided by the number of
nodes in the network and does not scale well with large networks.
The Random Key Pre-distribution proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [14] uses
pre loading nodes with a certain number of keys chosen at random from a larger
pool of keys. After deployment two nodes within communication range exchange
key-identifiers or challenges to discover common keys. Node pairs without common
key establish a key through a secure path. Drawback of this way of key establishment
is that the key gets exposed on each intermediate node to the destination, which has
been called the per-hop key exposure problem in [25]. Another drawback is the
requirement of pre-loading keys on each node without knowing what is the network
topology and the context where the device is going to be used. So there is a need
for generating keys on-demand.
Chan et al. [5] extended the idea of [14] proposing three new mechanisms for
key establishment using probabilistic key pre-deployment and using multipath key
reinforcement. Even this work uses pre-deployment of keys and does not use any
contextual information surrounding the device.
Zhu et al. [36] proposed a scheme inspired by [5] and [14] that uses multiple
logical paths to communicate the key shares. This thesis also proposes a similar
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idea. However there is no prior loading of keys on any node. Our solution is purely
on-demand.
To address the per hop key exposure problem [25] proposed using multiple node-
disjoint paths to establish pairwise keys between non-neighbor nodes. Based on
these paths, the pair-wise key, K, is divided into multiple fragments, each of which
is transmitted along one of the established secure paths. The solution works in
combination with existing key pre-distribution scheme. The main idea is, given a
network with n nodes, where a secure topology has been established using a shared-
key discovery phase. Now a node N1 needs to set up a pair-wise key with another
node N2. This is achieved using the following steps:
• N1 uses a Node-disjoint Path finding algorithm to get a set, PS, of node-disjoint
secure paths to N2.
• Let s = |PS|, be the size of the Node-disjoint Path set PS. Node N1 selects
a key K and divides it into s fragments, K1, K2...Ks, such that K = K1 ∪
K2 ∪ ... ∪Ks, where Ki ∪Ki+1 means a concatenation of Ki and K1+1. Also
each fragment contains a sequence number so that after all the fragments are
received, N2 can assemble the fragments.
• N1 sends Ki through the ith secure path.
• After N2 receives all the s fragments of the key, it can reproduce the key K
and uses it for secure communication with N1.
The requirement of finding end-to-end secure path from the source to the destination
is a strong requirement for [25]. To relax this condition [24] identifies nodes called
proxy that share keys with both the source and the destination. Depending on how
many fragments the source wants to break a key, it discovers those many proxies
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and sends each of them a fragment encrypted with the pairwise key it shares with
the proxy. The proxy decrypts the key and sends the fragment to the destination
with the key it shares with it. This avoids the strong requirement of having end-
to-end secure paths. Gupta et al. in [19] propose a similar idea, just naming the
proxy as friend nodes and requiring that the intermediate relay node share a key
with the destination only. Thus making it easier to find friend nodes compared to
proxy nodes. All these algorithms address the key establishment problem, leaving
the key generation on the users. It assumes that N1, the source some how has the
key present with it. These algorithms only solve the establishment of the already
generated key between node pairs. Our solution takes help of these ideas, specifically
from [25], but solves the key generation problem as well as efficient establishment of
the key.
The protocol SekGens [1], solves the problem of on-demand key generation us-
ing sensor data. Users use their mobile phones to perform specific gestures. Simple
gestures like, making letters of the English alphabet such as “O”, “N”, “V” etc. pro-
duces sensor data in the phones. These sensor data is collected from accelerometer,
acoustic, temperature sensors present on the phone. This contextual data is used on
the SekGens protocol to create a session key. The protocol quantizes the data gath-
ered from sensors and generates the raw key at each of the device pairs. Based on
the choice of best sensor data the protocol through an iterative algorithm generates
a 320 bit key, KEYQ. This local key is generated independently at the device pairs.
So there is high probability of mismatch of the KEY uQ at node u and KEY
v
Q at node
v. So by a process called “Reconciliation Phase” the protocol exchanges certain bits
of the keys between the devices and fixes the differing bits in them, to generate the
reconciled key, KEYRec. KEYRec on the two devices still might have small difference.
The protocol runs an error estimation to determine the difference and depending on
10
the error being within a pre-decided threshold, uses or discards the key. Finally if the
KEYRec is usable, the protocol hashes the key to remove eavesdropper’s knowledge
of the KEYRec. Finally, both the devices apply MD5 hashing on the remaining secret
bits to form the 128 bits KEYFinal.
The SekGens protocol for key generation is novel and is cryptographically strong.
However, it has the biggest drawback in the aspect of time of key generation and
significant user involvement for generating the key. An user needs to perform the
specific gestures with the mobile phone for about 6 to 8 seconds for the protocol to
establish the key. This process needs to be replicated for every other device that
a user wants to establish a key with. It is easy to see that as the number of users
increases this process becomes inconvenient for an user. Further, this will work only
when two devices are within a certain distance. So for a bigger gathering of mobile
phone users, the protocol fails completely.
We present a comparative study of the existing symmetric key establishment
schemes in Table 3.1. We have identified the following relevant metrics for this
thesis, to evaluate each scheme’s characteristics and convenience in deployment in
real systems. Firstly, is it on demand, meaning can the solution generate keys on the
fly. Secondly, scalability which means how well the solution works as the number of
devices is increased in the network. Thirdly, does it solve the key exposure problem
while communicating the key over multiple hops. Finally, context sensitivity which
means does the solution consider the device’s surrounding information in anyway in
the key establishment.
The problem we have solved in this thesis is, combine the capability of SekGens
protocol to generate on-demand session key from sensor data and the node-disjoint
path mechanism for communicating key fragments that allows an Ad-hoc Mobile
Cloud of users to establish session keys among them to securely communicate pair-
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Classification Pairwise Key Establishment Solu-
tion
On-
demand
Scalable Solves
Key Ex-
posure
Context
Insensitive
Probabilistic Key Pre-
deployment [Mitchell et al.,
Eschenauer et al.]
No No No
Pre-deployment and Multipath
[Chan et al., Zhu et al.]
No No Yes
Multipath and Friend/Proxy As-
sisted [Ling et al., Gupta et al.,
Li et al.]
No Yes Yes
Context
Sensitive
SekGens [Altaweel et al.] Yes No No
Scalable SekGens (SMA) [Mandal
et al.]
Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.1: Comparison of Pairwise Key Establishment Protocols for Ad-hoc Mobile
Networks
wise. We have minimized the number of times an user needs to run the SekGens
protocol and still be able to generate keys from sensor data.
3.1 Difference with Steiner Network Problem
The problem we solve in this thesis can be simplified to a know class of network
problems called Steiner Network [33] problems under certain assumptions about the
Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud. Given an AMC with the additional information that it is k -
connected, that is there are k node disjoint paths between every pair of non-neighbor
vertices, then the optimization problem is to find the minimal k -connected sub-graph,
that is also k -connected. This problem is called the “Minimum k -vertex connected
subgraph” problem, which is studied by other researchers [9, 22]. This k value is
actually what we define as the Key Fragment Factor (KFF) during our problem
formulation in Chapter 4. We are not making any such assumption or imposing such
requirement on the AMC. We only assume that the AMC is atleast biconnected. That
is between any pair of non-neighbor vertices, we are able to find two node-disjoint
12
paths. Our solution will honor or try satisfying this KFF value, k for pairs that
have those many number of node-disjoint paths between them. For pairs that do not
have the required number of node-disjoint paths between them, will have their keys
distributed over the best, that is whatever the number of node-disjoint paths that the
AMC provides for them. This differential treatment makes this problem no longer
just an optimization problem of finding the minimal k -vertex connected subgraph.
Since in Steiner Network problem, the starting assumption is that the graph is k -
vertex connected and then it finds the minimum k -vertex connected subgraph from
there, our problem differs from it by not making that initial assumption about the
AMC.
The different connectivity requirement between the vertices is a problem of find-
ing the minimal subgraph from a given graph that satisfies the requirement. To the
best of our knowledge, there has been very few works that solve the node-disjoint
connectivity requirement problem for undirected simple graphs. One of the inter-
esting work is [4]. It uses a metaheuristic greedy approach to come up with an
approximate solution. It uses a iterative search to improve over the earlier solution.
The goodness of the solution is determined by the number of iterations. It seems that
this approach might be slow in converging to its solution and become impractical
for our AMC, where we need fast convergence, since user convenience is one of the
desired property. The solution proposed in this thesis is expected to be faster, since
it calculates the set of node-disjoint paths between all pairs and then identifies the
critical edges. So our solution might perform better than existing solutions like [4].
3.2 Application of Network Coding
The use of multiple node-disjoint paths for distributing the keys has some short-
comings. The information even though divided over multiple mutually exclusive
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paths makes it difficult for a curious node to get the complete picture, but does not
guard against the leakage of information. Ideas can be burrowed from network coding
techniques to prevent this information leak [3,13]. The adversary node functions as a
wiretapper, who can read the packets that it forwards. With redundant information
added to the packets, even an internal node that helps in the packet forwarding,
acting maliciously can not gather too much information that can actually compro-
mise the complete key. Such network coding based solutions [12] that guard against
wiretappers would make our proposed key establishment protocol more robust.
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4. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter we describe the system model and formulate the problem mathe-
matically.
4.1 System Description
4.1.1 System Model
Consider an Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) having a collection of N mobile phones,
{v1, v2, ..., vN}. The AMC is modeled as a graph G = (V,E), where V (G) is the set
of vertices, i.e. phones and E(G) is the set of edges. An edge e = (vi, vj) ∈ E(G),
implies vi and vj are within SekGens-distance. G is the connectivity graph. The goal
is to establish pairwise keys between all N devices.
There are two ways to establish key between any pair, SekGens and Node-disjoint
path key generation. For any vi and vj, if there exists a e = (vi, vj) ∈ E(G), then
we can use SekGens. We can use Node-disjoint path key generation also between vi
and vj if there are adequate number of such paths between them, which we explain
in the next paragraph.
As mentioned in [25] to avoid the per hop key exposure problem, a key needs to
be broken into k fragments and sent over k node-disjoint paths, where k ≥ 2. The
receiver needs to receive all k fragments in order to recreate the key. We introduce
parameter k as Key Fragment Factor (KFF) in our model.
To make the communication of the key fragments secure over the multiple node-
disjoint paths additional technologies can be augmented over our solution. The
process of distributing the key fragments, is basically a multicast network communi-
cation. To secure the key fragments while in transit, over the node-disjoint paths, we
can use existing solutions from information theory [6,12] for securely communicating
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the fragments. Further to make it hard for an adversary to recover the bits in the
fragments network coding techniques [29] can be leveraged, that would reduce the
information leakage, in the presence of adversary devices.
4.1.2 Adversary Model
The adversary is a single or a group of malicious device(s), who wish to discover
the key(s) that is being established between device pair(s) in the AMC. For an
adversary to recreate the key, it has to compromise one node on each of the k paths.
We focus on inside attacker only, as such devices have easy access to the key being
exchanged. The attacker is only a passive entity. It does not jam the communication
medium. Also the attacker does not modify the data it is entrusted to communicate
or forward to other device, since data manipulation makes the attack an active one
and we consider only passive attacker model in our system.
4.1.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions,
• We assume that the users use mobile devices that support at least one sensor.
Sensor data is required to generate the keys whenever required.
• Two nodes can perform SekGens only if they are within the SekGens-distance.
• The communication of the key fragments over the node-disjoint paths takes
less time than performing SekGens between two devices.
• There is no inherent vulnerability in the mobile devices themselves. That is
the devices are not infected with malware a priori which could manipulate the
key fragments.
• A node is able to generate cryptographic key from already stored sensor data
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and break it into required number of fragments, when required for use in node-
disjoint path key establishment.
• The topology of G does not change while our key establishment algorithm is
running.
4.1.4 Problem Formulation
For N vertices in the connectivity graph G we need
(
N
2
)
pairwise keys. It is trivial
to notice that when G is a complete graph, each device can perform SekGens with
every other node, but it is inefficient. It is possible to reduce the number of execution
of SekGens by replacing some of these SekGens by node-disjoint paths to distribute
the key fragments instead.
We formulate the problem as the following optimization problem:
Given a connectivity graph G and a KFF k, decide on the devices that should perform
SekGens so as to minimize the number of executions of SekGens while establishing
pairwise key for all (u, v) ∈ (V (G)× V (G)).
4.2 Problem Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss the characteristics of the optimization problem.
Before going into the details of our algorithm we present some properties that the
connectivity graph G should possess for a feasible solution and argue on the hardness
of the problem.
4.2.1 Feasibility
Feasibility is defined as the requirements that the system model needs to meet
for generating pairwise keys for all nodes in a given connectivity graph G and for the
specified KFF value k. The connectivity graph needs to have certain properties and
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the nodes must be able to perform some minimum number of SekGens individually,
for the solution proposed later in the paper to work. We explain them and argue
their necessity below.
We discuss the Lemma(s) and Theorem below for a connectivity graph where the
KFF value k = 2, is the requirement. Afterwards we generalize it for k > 2 cases.
Lemma 1. For a given connectivity graph G and any vertex pair vi and vj, both
vi and vj need to perform at least two SekGens each to use node-disjoint paths to
establish key.
Proof. Let P1 and P2 be two node disjoint paths between vertices vi and vj. Let
P1 = {vi, v11, v12, ..., vj} and P2 = {vi, v21, v22, ..., vj}. Since we claim that P1 and P2
are node disjoint paths between vi and vj, therefore (P1−{vi, vj})∩(P2−{vi, vj}) = ∅.
Hence none of the nodes that occurs on one path can occur on the other for the pair
of nodes vi and vj. This implies that vi must perform SekGens with v11 and v21
and they are distinct vertices. This is necessary because the key needs to be broken
into at least two fragments and sent over two node-disjoint paths. Similarly vj must
perform two SekGens with the last node on the two paths.
Before presenting the next Lemma, we introduce a basic graph theory concept. In
graph theory, a biconnected graph is a connected and nonseparable graph, meaning
that if any vertex were to be removed, the graph will remain connected. Therefore
a biconnected graph has no articulation or cut vertices.
Lemma 2. For a given connectivity graph G, to find two node-disjoint paths between
every pair of vertices vi and vj, G must be biconnected.
Proof. Consider the graph in Figure 4.1(a).The vertex X is a cut vertex or ar-
ticulation point for the graph, since the removal of vertex X would increase the
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number of connected components. Let G1 and G2 be the two subgraphs of the
original graph G that are created on removing X. In the original graph G, for
any two nodes vi and vj, such that vi ∈ G1 and vj ∈ G2, a path from vi to vj is
P = {vi, v1, v2, ...X, ..., vn−1, vn, vj}. To find two such paths that are node-disjoint is
not possible in G for such vi and vj, since the node X will be present on all such
paths. By the assumption on our connectivity graph, such a topology will not be
supported by our algorithm.
S
D
X
(a)
S
D
G1
G2
(b)
Figure 4.1: Our Solution assumes the connectivity graph does not have an
articulation point for k = 2
The statements of Lemma 1 and 2 must be satisfied for all connectivity graphs
where k = 2 is the KFF value.
4.2.2 Hardness
We show the hardness of the optimization problem and provide an intuition of
how it can be reduced to a known NP-hard problem, for the case of k = 2. Hence
for the general case k the problem is also NP-hard.
Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be a connectivity graph with N nodes and OPT be the
optimal number of SekGens for generating key between all device pairs in G. Then,
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a. OPT ≥ N , for k = 2.
b. OPT = N , iff there exists a Hamiltonian Cycle in G.
Proof. To show that the minimum number of SekGens for k = 2 cannot be less
than N , lets assume that the minimum number of SekGens for G is N − 1 and
then show a contradiction. The claim is that after performing N − 1 SekGens each
node will have two unique node disjoint paths with every other node. If we start
with N disconnected nodes and connect the pairs that perform SekGens, we get a
graph, G
′
= (V
′
, E
′
) that has |V ′ | = N nodes and |E ′ | = N − 1 edges. By [20]
, if G
′
is connected and |V ′| = |E ′| + 1, then every two nodes of G′ are joined by
only one unique, that is node-disjoint path. So there cannot be two node-disjoint
paths between non neighbor nodes in G
′
. Therefore for N node graph the number
of SekGens has to be greater than or equal to N .
For the equality condition, we claim that for G the minimum number of SekGens
is N . Let G
′
be the graph with N nodes and N edges where each edge denotes
SekGens has been performed between the neighbors. We need to show that G
′
is a
Hamiltonian Cycle of G. G
′
will have 2 node disjoint paths between every pair of
node that did not perform SekGens, only then will those node be able to establish
key using node-disjoint path. We remove one of the edges, e = (u, v) from G
′
. Since
there was 2 node-disjoint paths before the edge was removed, there should still be
1 node-disjoint path between every pair in the new graph, which we call G
′′
. So G
′′
is connected and |V (G′′)| = |E(G′′)| + 1. By [20], G′′ has to be acyclic and if the
removed edge, e = (u, v) is added back, where u and v were non-adjacent in G
′′
,
since we had removed the edge between them, the resulting graph has exactly one
cycle. This new graph is actually G
′
since e was removed from G
′
to obtain G
′′
and
was added back. So G
′
has N nodes and N edges. From definition, G
′
is then a
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Hamiltonian Cycle for G.
Now assume that G is Hamiltonian and prove the equality condition. Let the
graph G be Hamiltonian and assume G
′
is the corresponding Hamiltonian Cycle of
G. So G
′
is a graph with N nodes and N edges. Every non neighbor node on G
′
has
two node-disjoint paths between them. Hence performing SekGens between nodes
that are connected by an edge on G
′
will be enough. Since these N nodes of G
′
are
actually the same nodes in G, this will be the least number of SekGens for G, which
is equal to the number of nodes N .
Using the result from Theorem 3, for the case of k = 2, the problem of determining
the minimum number of SekGens, is equivalent to finding the Hamiltonian Cycle for
the connectivity graph. The Hamiltonian Cycle problem is a known NP-complete
problem [10]. Hence for k = 2, if we can find the minimum number of SekGens
for G, we are able to find the Hamiltonian Cycle, if it exists. Hence our problem is
reducible to the Hamiltonian Cycle problem.
4.2.3 General k Value
The Lemma and Theorem stated earlier are for the case of k = 2. We generalize
them for k > 2 case.
For k > 2 case, for the key to be broken into k fragments there needs to be k
number of node-disjoint paths from the source to the destination. Using the reason
of Lemma 1, to have k node-disjoint paths the source needs to perform at least k
SekGens, with k neighbors.
For having k node-disjoint paths between a source and a destination node the
connectivity graph should be k-connected. This requirement ensures that the algo-
rithm used to find node-disjoint paths, will find k such paths. This is the generalized
version of Lemma 2. In real life AMCs it is not always possible to have the connec-
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tivity graph to possess this property. For any k KFF value requested by the users,
our solution is a best effort endeavor. This means that if it is possible to distribute
the key over k -node disjoint paths, we would do so. Otherwise, whatever the maxi-
mum number of paths we can find between the vertex pair we distribute the key over
them. This is called differential security level.
Using Theorem 3, for k = 2, we showed that the problem is reducible to a known
NP-complete problem. So for k > 2 the problem becomes harder.
Therefore we propose a heuristic algorithm for solving this optimization problem
in the next chapter.
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5. THE MINIMIZATION ALGORITHM
5.1 Sekgens Minimization Algorithm (SMA)
In this section we propose our algorithm to establish keys between pairs of devices
while trying to minimize the number of SekGens for the network.
5.1.1 Main Idea
The basic idea is to select neighbors vi and vj at each iteration and run SekGens
between them, such that it helps other pairs to use node-disjoint paths to distribute
their key, using the edge (vi,vj) that is already secured. This will allow those pairs
to send key fragments on those secured paths and establish key between them. Here
we are greedy in choosing a pair which is the best choice at that iteration, with the
hope that it will minimize the total number of SekGens for the complete network. We
continue doing this until all pairs have keys between them. Our algorithm determines
the best pairs to perform SekGens for a given connectivity graph. We present this
idea algorithmically in the next subsection.
5.1.2 SekGens Minimization Algorithm (SMA)
The SekGens Minimization Algorithm (SMA) has two parts, which are Algo-
rithm 1 called Edge Importance-Value Calculator and Algorithm 2 called Schedule
Generator.
Algorithm 1 determines how many times an edge occurs on some node-disjoint
path in G. This is recorded as the Importance-Value for that edge. It uses an existing
Node-Disjoint path finding algorithm (NDPAlgorithm) [10] and calculates all the
node-disjoint paths between each device pair (lines 1-2). The paths that are at least
of length 2 are usable for sending key fragments. This is because two neighbors
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Algorithm 1 SMA: Edge Importance-Value Calculator
Input: Network Topology G, Key Fragment Factor k
Output: Calculate the Importance of each edge, e ∈ E(G)
1: for all (u, v) ∈ (V × V ) do
2: Puv = NDPAlgorithm(G, u, v)
3: Initialize counter i = 0
4: for all p ∈ Puv do
5: if PathLength(p) ≥ 2 then
6: i← i + 1
7: else
8: Delete p from Puv
9: if i ≥ k then
10: Add pair (u,v) to D {This pair has the required number of paths to satisfy
KFF of k}
11: Keep only k shortest paths
12: else
13: if i ≥ 2 and < k then
14: Add pair (u,v) to D, mark as reduced security
15: else
16: Delete (u,v) from node pair list
17: for all e ∈ E do
18: Fe := 0
19: for all e ∈ E do
20: for all (u, v) ∈ (V × V ) do
21: for all p ∈ Puv do
22: if e ∈ p then
23: Fe ← Fe + 1
24: Sort F in descending order of edge importance value
cannot communicate a key fragment securely between them unless they already have
a key between them. So if vi and vj want to establish a key, the edge e = (vi, vj)
if exists cannot be used by them. The algorithm checks for such paths and deletes
the ineligible paths (lines 3-8). It then checks if there are the required k number of
node-disjoint paths between the node pair and stores such pair (line 9-10). This is
used to decide whether this pair can use node-disjoint paths with the specified KFF
of k to establish key. In case the required k paths are not available, the algorithm
marks that pair as using reduced security in terms of less than k KFF value. It
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then computes the importance value of each edge in the graph by accumulating the
number of times the edge occurs on a node-disjoint path between some source S
and some destination D (lines 11-17). The algorithm then arranges the edges in a
decreasing sequence of their relative importance and maintains it as queue (line 18),
that is used by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 decides the pairs that will use SekGens and the ones that are going
to use node-disjoint paths for key establishment. This is done by greedily choosing
an edge in each iteration with the hope that securing this pair will benefit the most.
Initially all pairs are insecure, i. e. there does not exist a key between them. The
algorithm adds each pair to a set (U), called the insecure set and initializes an empty
set (S) that contains all the pairs that have established a key between them (line
1-3). It also initializes a timer (t) and a set (Q), called Schedule Maintainer, to keep
track of the method that will be used to establish key between a particular pair (lines
4-5). In each iteration it dequeues the most important edge, e (line 7). It deletes
the pair that makes up that edge from U and F (line 8). It adds that pair to the
secure set S (line 9). The end vertices of e will perform SekGens, which is recorded
in Q (line 11). Each element of Q is of the form (vi, vj, 0/1), which denotes that
node vi and vj should perform SekGens if the third entry in the tuple is 1, otherwise
they use node-disjoint path to establish key. It then looks for all pairs that are still
insecure (line 12) and have edge e on a path in their node-disjoint path set (line 13).
If such a pair is found, then it checks if that pair has all its paths in its path set,
have edges that have a key on them (line 16-27). If such a pair is found, then it adds
that pair to S and also recording in Q that node-disjoint path is to be used for key
establishment between them, by setting the third entry in the tuple as 0 (line 28-32).
The algorithm terminates when F becomes empty and also all the pairs are secured,
i. e. U becomes empty (line 33).
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5.1.3 SekGens Minimization Algorithm Example
To demonstrate the execution of our algorithm, consider the connectivity graph
of Figure 5.1(a). The connectivity graph, G has 5 nodes and 6 edges. In the
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Figure 5.1: Example Graph (G) and intermediate steps to illustrate SekGens
Minimization Algorithm
naive approach we perform SekGens on all possible pairs. It will still not be possible
for pairs like (1, 4) to establish a key, since they are not within SekGens-distance.
We assume that the KFF parameter is k = 2, that is two node-disjoint paths are
sufficient to send key fragments between any node pair. Using the NDPAlgorithm in
Edge Importance-Value Calculator, we get the following node-disjoint paths between
the node pairs as shown in Table 5.1. Only paths that are at least of length 2 can be
used to send key fragments. One hop paths cannot be used to securely send a key, as
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node-pair(vi, vj) Path Set
(0, 3) [(0, 4), (4, 3)], [(0, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3)]
(1, 3) [(1, 0), (0, 3)], [(1, 2), (2, 3)]
(2, 4) [(2, 3), (3, 4)], [(2, 1), (1, 0), (0, 4)]
(1, 4) [(1, 0), (0, 4)], [(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)]
(0, 2) [(0, 3), (3, 2)], [(0, 1), (1, 2)]
Table 5.1: Node-disjoint Path Set between Node-pairs in G
explained earlier and hence are not considered. The algorithm assigns Importance-
Value, shown in Table 5.2 and also Figure 5.1(b) to edges in G based on the number
of time it occurs in some node-disjoint path using the data from Table 5.1.
edge(vi, vj) Importance-Value
(2, 3) 5
(1, 2) 5
(0, 1) 5
(3, 4) 3
(0, 4) 3
(0, 3) 2
Table 5.2: Edges in G with their Importance-Values
The Importance-Value of the edges (2, 3), (1, 2) and (0, 1) are maximum and
equal, so Schedule Generator algorithm picks one of them first. It marks SekGens to
be performed between those two vertices, which is denoted by dotted line in Figure
5.1(c). Now (2, 3) are secured. It then checks for pairs that use this edge on any of
its node-disjoint paths. It finds such pairs, like (1, 3), but it will see that none of the
pairs have all the links on their path set secured, meaning a key fragment cannot be
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forwarded securely from the source to the destination node. It then takes the next
important edge, which is (1, 2). The node pair (1, 2) perform SekGens, as shown in
Figure 5.1(d). It does the same check as before, but fails to find any such pair that
can use paths that are secured on each link from the source to the destination. The
algorithm proceeds like this until it reaches the situation in Figure 5.1(e). Now it can
find two node-disjoint paths between all the non-neighbor nodes and also between
the neighbors (0, 3) and uses node-disjoint paths to establish the rest of the keys. So
in the Figure 5.1(f), the edges represent that the nodes have a pairwise key between
each one of them. The dotted edges signify SekGens was used for key establishment
and the solid lined edges signify use of node-disjoint paths. For the given G, we
could establish all the keys between each pair with 5 SekGens.
5.2 Time Complexity Analysis
We provide an analysis of the execution time for the minimization algorithm.
The total execution time for establishing keys between every pair in the network is
calculated as,
Total Execution T ime (TET ) = Schedule Generation T ime (SGT )
+ Real − time Execution T ime (RET )
where, SGT is the time it takes for the SekGens Minimization Algorithm to decide
which pairs are to use SekGens and which ones will use Node-disjoint paths and RET
is the time taken by the users in the network to execute this with their mobile phones
in real time. We comment on the theoretical time and present experimental results
for SGT only. The time for RET will depend on the user’s level of engagement in
the process and communication throughput in the location where this solution is
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deployed. Since, performing such real experiments were cumbersome and difficult in
the limited scope and resources available, we are unable to show actual data on the
RET portion of the total execution time.
The Schedule Generation Time, involves running the SMA algorithm on a cen-
tralized machine. Referring to Algorithm 1, the time complexity of NDPAlgorithm is
the major contributor to the overall execution time of the algorithm. The NDPAlgo-
rithm involves finding the maximum-flow value from any source node to a destination
node. The time complexity of the maximum-flow algorithm using the library used in
our implementation is O(|V |3) [11], where V is the set of vertices of the connectivity
graph, G. The NDPAlgorithm is called O(|V |2) times. So the overall time com-
plexity of the loop in line 1 of Algorithm 1 is O(|V |5), which is within polynomial
time. The inner loop takes less time compared to NDPAlgorithm and so does not
affect the Big-O calculation. The other loop in line 13, has a time complexity of
O(|E| ∗ |V |2 ∗ k), where E is the set of edges in G and k is the Key Fragment Factor.
This loop is expected to take lesser time compared to the earlier loop. Hence, the
overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is decided by the execution of NDPAlgorithm
and in our implementation it of the order of O(|V |5). For Algorithm 2 the loop in
line 13-33 is the major contributor to the time complexity. The outer loop runs for
O(|V |2) times. The inner loop in line 16-27, runs for O(k) times with the innermost
loop in line 19-23 depends on the number of edges in the longest path from the source
to the destination node, which can at most be O(|E|). Hence the total complexity of
Algorithm 2 is O(|E|∗|V |2∗k). So adding the time complexity of the two algorithms,
the overall complexity of the SGT phase is O(|V |5).
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Algorithm 2 SMA: Schedule Generator
Input: V (G), Edge-Importance-List F
Output: Schedule Qt(u, v, 0/1)
1: for all (u, v) ∈ (V × V ) do
2: Add pair (u,v) to U
3: Initialize Secure Set S := ∅
4: Initialize Timer t := 0
5: Initialize Schedule Maintainer Q := ∅
6: repeat
7: e←MAX(F )
8: Delete e from F and U
9: Add e(= (x, y)) to S
10: Increment t← t + 1
11: Set Qt := (x, y, 1)
12: for all (u, v) ∈ U do
13: if e ∈ some p ∈ Puv then
14: no of paths := Size(Puv)
15: Initialize counter j := 0
16: for all q ∈ Puv do
17: path length := PathLength(q)
18: Initialize counter i := 0
19: for all e ∈ q do
20: if e ∈ S then
21: i← i + 1
22: else
23: Break
24: if i == path length then
25: j ← j + 1
26: else
27: Break
28: if j == no of paths then
29: Delete (u,v) from U and F (if it occurs)
30: Add (u,v) to S
31: Increment t← t + 1
32: Set Qt := (u, v, 0)
33: until F 6= ∅ & U 6= ∅
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6. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
6.1 Performance Evaluation
In this section we present the performance evaluation of our SekGens Minimiza-
tion Algorithm. We evaluate our algorithm based on the parameters that model the
possible network and user requirements. In each case we plot the number of SekGens
performed against one of the parameters.
• Network Size (N): We vary the number of nodes in the graph to study this
parameter. It reflects whether our algorithm reduces the number of SekGens
that would otherwise be required for a group of mobile phones without using
any optimization. The increasing number of nodes shows the scalability issue
of SekGens that we identified as one of its major drawbacks.
• Node Density (r): Node density depends on the number of neighbors that a
node has. The value of r actually is the SekGens-distance. This parameter
helps to understand how our algorithm performs as the density of the devices
in the network changes. With more nodes within one hop, meaning denser
network, our algorithm should be judicious in choosing the optimal number
of neighbors to perform SekGens with. We study how many SekGens are
performed as the number of neighbors for each device increases or decreases.
• Key Fragment Factor (k): We defined the number of fragments the key is
broken into as the KFF, as more the number of fragments the more difficult it
becomes for an adversary to compromise the key. Generating more fragments
implies we need to find more node-disjoint paths. As the number of required
paths increases it takes more SekGens in securing all the links on such paths
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before we can use the node-disjoint solution of distributing the key to the
destination. We expect a positive correlation between k and the number of
SekGens.
The simulation environment we use for testing our algorithm is by generating random
geometric graphs (RGG) using the python library “python-igraph” [11] and measur-
ing the number of SekGens value in them. We compare our algorithm’s performance
with the Naive-algorithm and Random-algorithm.
The Naive-algorithm does not use any optimization or decision on choosing pairs
to perform SekGens. It just performs SekGens between every pair that are neighbors.
So the number of SekGens in all its applications on all graphs are equal to the number
of edges in the graph.
The Random-algorithm uses a random number generator in each iteration to
decide on an edge to perform SekGens between its end nodes. After each such
SekGens it however checks to see if it can satisfy the required k end to end secured
node-disjoint paths for any pair. If it can find such a pair it uses node-disjoint paths
to establish key between those pairs.
6.2 Number of SekGens for each Parameter
Figure 6.1 shows the number of SekGens that are performed with the different
network sizes. We construct the test networks by randomly placing N nodes in a two
dimensional unit square and connecting two nodes if they are closer to each other
than a given radius, which is actually the SekGens-distance in the graphs. We used
the values for parameters r = 0.8 and k = 3 in all these simulation.
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Figure 6.1: Number of SekGens in different sized networks
We get different but similar trends in the number of SekGens using other r and
k values. The plots show the average number of SekGens that are performed for the
network sizes, N ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} with a confidence of 95%. Com-
pared to the Naive and Random algorithm our SMA algorithm performs consistently
better as the network size increases. For example in a 50 node network, the Naive
algorithm performs SekGens on all the edges, resulting in more than 1000 SekGens
and Random performs close to 800 SekGens. Whereas our SMA algorithm needs
about 250 SekGens, which is about 75% less and about 65% less than the number of
SekGens performed by Naive and Random algorithm respectively.
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Figure 6.2: Number of SekGens on a network with 40 nodes with varying density
Figure 6.2 shows the results when the network size is kept constant, but the node
density is varied. This is achieved by changing the SekGens-distance value. With
larger SekGens-distance r, a node has more neighbors to possibly perform SekGens
and hence more possibility of executing higher number of SekGens. We kept the
network size fixed at N = 40 and KFF parameter at k = 3, which again with
other values will give similar results. SMA performs significantly better compared to
the other two. One interesting trend is observed in the results though. Intuitively,
it is expected that as the number of neighbors of a node increases, SMA should
have increasing value for number of SekGens. The results show that the number
of SekGens increases till a certain density (here r = 0.55) and then falls slightly as
the graph becomes denser. The reason behind this trend is, for sparse graph there
is anyway less neighbors to do SekGens with, hence the lesser value. As the graph
becomes dense more paths are available to distribute the keys using node-disjoint
34
paths and SMA ends up being greedy and performs some redundant SekGens. As
the node’s degree increases further, even though more node-disjoint paths are found,
there are shorter length paths available. Since SMA prefers shorter paths, the number
of SekGens goes down slightly compared to less dense graphs but with longer length
paths between pairs.
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Figure 6.3: Number of SekGens on a network with 40 devices with varying key
fragments
Figure 6.3 captures the performance of the Random and SMA algorithms as the
parameter for number of node-disjoint paths, i. e. KFF k between pairs is changed.
We fix the network size to N = 40 and SekGens-Distance r = 0.7. We did not show
the values for the Naive Algorithm, since it will be equal to the number of edges for
all the k values. SMA’s performance is clearly better than the Random Algorithm
and keeps the total SekGens value at almost 50% of what the Random approach
gives, when k is varied from 2 to 8.
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6.3 Load Distribution
We define load as the number of SekGens performed by an individual node in a
network. In lemma 1 we proved that for having k node-disjoint paths, that is for a
key strength of k, each device needs to perform at least k SekGens. Since a node
might fall on the path of a node-disjoint path between a pair, the actual number of
SekGens performed by a node would be more than the minimum requirement. A
good algorithm should try and distribute the number of SekGens evenly across all
the nodes in the network. Figure 6.4 shows the load on each node in a 100 node
network for SMA and Random algorithm respectively. Our SMA achieves a better
distribution with the average number of SekGens per node being around 26, while
the corresponding value on the same graph for Random edge selection is 60. Using
the max-min fairness index, we can measure how fair is the load distribution in the
network. Using SMA we get a fairness value of 0.32. While for Random algorithm
the fairness value is around 0.34. Even though the fairness measure is comparable
for the two algorithms, the absolute value of the number of SekGens performed by a
node is more in the Random approach than our SMA approach.
6.4 Differential Security
We discussed the relaxation of the vertex connectivity requirement on the AMC
in Chapter 3. We mentioned that when the users ask for a KFF of k, to distribute the
key over those many node-disjoint paths, the connectivity graph needs to be k -vertex
connected. For very high k value, the AMC might not be that richly connected. For
such scenarios, our solution falls back to the best effort security that it can provide.
Our algorithm optimizes on the number of executions of SekGens, while distributing
the key fragments over the maximum possible node-disjoint paths for every vertex
pair as the connectivity graph can support. The number of fragments that we break
36
  0
  10
  20
  30
  40
  50
  60
N
um
be
r o
f S
ek
G
en
s P
er
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
a 
N
od
e
Increasing Order of Number of SekGens Performed using SMA
  0
  10
  20
  30
  40
  50
  60
  70
  80
  90
N
um
be
r o
f S
ek
G
en
s P
er
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
a 
N
od
e
Increasing Order of Number of SekGens Performed using Random
Figure 6.4: SekGens performed per Node in a 100 node network
37
the key into determines the security level of the key establishment. More fragments
implies hard it is for an adversary to capture all the parts of the key and hence higher
the security level. With different vertex connectivity in between different vertex pairs,
the security level is thus different for the pairs in the AMC. We present in Figure 6.5
a case where the KFF value is 20. Since here the key is to be distributed into
such a large number of fragments, the number of SekGens is considerably high. Still
compared to the Random and Naive approaches, our solution performs consistently
better. To study what is the security level we supported for the different pairs, in
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Figure 6.5: Number of SekGens for k = 20, a high KFF value
Figure 6.6 we show the distribution of the vertex connectivity value between the
vertex pairs in a 40 node AMC, that we used in Figure 6.5 to see the number of
execution of SekGens.
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Figure 6.6: Example showing the idea of differential security, because of different
number of node-disjoint paths between vertex pairs
If we had tried to optimize on the number of SekGens by limiting the vertex
connectivity value to the least for the AMC, that is 5, then even though we had
better connectivity for 95% of the pairs, we would not have leveraged it. Thus going
by Steiner Network based solution, which searches for the overall vertex connectivity
of the graph, the security level would be gravely lower for almost all the pairs. With
our differential security level approach we are able to support more robust (from
security perspective) key establishment.
6.5 Execution Time
We refer to the time of execution discussion that we presented in the Chapter 5
and present the system time needed for deciding the pairs that would use SekGens
and Node-disjoint path respectively for key establishment. We tested our algorithm
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on a portable laptop which has an Intel T7500 (dual core @2.20 GHz) processor
and runs Ubuntu 14.04 (32-bit). We ran the following experiments. First, keeping
the SekGens distance (r) fixed at 0.7 and the KFF (k) at 3, we varied the number
of nodes (N). We generated different Random Geometric Graphs (RGGs) and took
the average time of Schedule Generation Time (SGT). We plotted the average SGT
value with 95% confidence interval in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Schedule Generation Time for different sizes of the network
The time to decide on the pairs for SekGens execution for networks of sizes till
30 is less than even 2 seconds. For a 40 node network it is around 5 seconds. While
for a 50 node network it is bit higher taking around 14 seconds. Still considering the
significant number of less SekGens that is performed, this initial time expenditure is
worth while. With other values of “N”, “r” and “k” we would get similar values of
execution times.
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Figure 6.8: Schedule Generation Time for same sized network, with varying
SekGens-distance
For the next experiment we kept the network size, “N” fixed at 40 nodes and
KFF (k) at 3, but changed the SekGens-distance, “r”, Figure 6.8. It is expected
that as we increase the SekGens-distance, there will be more and more neighbors
for a particular node. With more neighbors, that is denser graph, the greedy SMA
algorithm would perform more number of SekGens, hence longer time to decide on
those SekGens. Following the similar trend we saw in Figure 6.2, where the number
of SekGens increased upto certain density and then fell slightly, we see exactly similar
plot for the execution time as well. The same argument we presented explaining the
results in Figure 6.2 applies here.
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Figure 6.9: Schedule Generation Time for same sized network, with varying Key
Fragment Factor
For final experiment, we changed the Key Fragment Factor (k), but kept the
network size fixed at N = 40 and SekGens-distance r = 0.75. With more number
of fragments the key being required to break into, the SMA algorithm requires more
time to decide on the best node pairs that would perform SekGens. Hence, as
expected, as we increased the value for “k” the SGT value also increased. However,
it is encouraging to observe in Figure 6.9 that even with considerable large network
of 40 nodes, the time required to decide on the SekGens pair is just 4 second for
KFF = 2 and not more than 10 seconds for KFF = 8.
So we can claim that SMA can decide on the optimal pairs for SekGens within a
reasonably short time, within tens of seconds, for real network deployments meeting
the required Key Fragment Factor, for both dense and sparse node placements.
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6.6 Security Risk vs Number of SekGens
[25] proposes an analytical model for quantifying the risk, denoted as r involved
in using a set of s node-disjoint paths to establish key between two nodes. For
a network of n devices, with x of them being adversary or malicious devices that
collude among themselves, the probability of the key being discovered for a single
pair is given by,
r = prob[{P1, P2, ...Ps}, x, n]
=
∑l1
j1=1
∑l2
j2=1
...
∑ls
js
(
n−∑sm=1 lm−s+∑si=1 ji
x−s
)(
n
x
) (6.1)
where Pi is one of the s node-disjoint paths and li is the intermediate hop count of
path Pi. We simulate graphs with n = 20 nodes, where x = 16 nodes are malicious
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of Security Risk and corresponding No. of SekGens
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and vary the KFF parameter k on these graphs and study the risk, calculated using
Equation (6.1). We measure the corresponding number of SekGens for each k value.
Intuitively, as the number of node-disjoint paths increases the risk of key getting
revealed to an adversary should reduce, since more number of nodes need to be
compromised to gather all the key fragments. Likewise as the number of node-
disjoint paths increases, as we saw in Figure 6.3 the number of SekGens will also
increase. We calculated the average security risk for a pair of nodes for each k value
and the corresponding number of SekGens performed in the network and present
it in Figure 6.10. It is clear from the figure that as the number of fragments or k
value increases, the risk or probability of key being compromised decreases, while
the required number of SekGens increases. With more number of SekGens, the time
establish pairwise keys between all the devices will also increase. Thus depending
on the risk and time expenditure thresholds, a practical deployment of our solution
will need to have some trade-off that the users need to decide. To keep the risk of
key compromise low, we have to divide the key into more fragments and the users
in the AMC need to perform more SekGens, hence spend more time in establishing
pairwise keys among all the devices.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Generation of on demand pairwise key in an ad-hoc network composed of mobile
phones is advantageous in real world scenarios like disaster area, battle field, under
developed communities, etc where infrastructure network is not available or unre-
liable. Using sensor data to generate such key is an innovative idea. However the
existing solution does not scale over more than a pair of mobile devices.
In this thesis we proposed a solution that can generate on demand pairwise keys
through efficient use of SekGens for an Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud. For a dense network
where each user might have to perform SekGens with every other device in the
worst case, our solution reduces it to less than 50% of the theoretical maximum
value [27]. For sparse network, where SekGens completely fails for devices that are
not neighbors, our solution is able to enable key establishment for such devices.
Instead of the centralized approach that is taken in this thesis, a distributed
solution is more practical. It would be a new problem to explore a distributed
solution instead of this centralized approach as future work. Use of other heuristic
methods, like Simulated Annealing to solve the optimization problem are future
extensions to this work. Deciding how to schedule the SekGens in the network, so
that parallel such executions can be performed, is a related problem.
The problem addressed in this thesis is NP-Hard, as we have already explained
while analysing the problem. This thesis proposes an approach to solve this problem
and achieve an approximate solution. There are existing work that solve similar
graph problem(s), particularly Steiner Network class of problems. Those problems
can be mapped to the SekGens Minimization Problem if modified in appropriate
way. An interesting future work would be to compare the performance of the Sek-
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Gens Minimization Algorithm, proposed in this thesis with similar network design
solutions [4].
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